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We examine the under-pricing and long-run performance of 230 A-share IPOs issued 
from 1997 to 1998 in China using comparable firm multiples.  Consistent with 
previous studies, we find that the A-share IPOs are severely under-priced.  We also 
find that they are under-valued by about 50% by issuers and underwriters at the offer.  
In addition, we find a positive relationship between magnitudes of under-valuation and 
initial return of IPO, thereby implying that under-valuation may cause under-pricing. 
In contrast with under-valuation by issuers and underwriters, investors tend to 
over-valuate IPOs on the listing day.  This may indicate that under-valuation by 
issuers and underwriters and over-valuation by investors jointly causes the severe 
under-pricing of IPOs in China. Moreover, cross-sectional regression results suggest 
that relative values of IPOs are critical determinants of the severe under-pricing of 
A-share IPOs in China. We also find that relaxing government regulation of offering 
price increases under-pricing, and thus conclude that the severe under-pricing of 
A-share IPOs in China is not caused by the government regulation of offering price. 
Furthermore, we detect a 30% out-performance of IPOs with respect to the market 
after 36 months of listing. But IPOs under-perform their matching firms by 25% after 
36 months of listing, and those IPOs over-valued by investors on the listing day 
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1.1 Literature Review 
Under-pricing of initial public offering (IPO) refers to a phenomenon where the initial 
market price of a newly listed stock exceeds its issue price. It was first documented by 
Stoll and Curley (1970), Reilly (1973), Logue (1973), and Ibbotson (1975).  
Investigating IPO under-pricing has become an important research agenda in the past 
three decades.  Among others, Ritter and Welch (2002) give a detailed survey of 
IPO-related issues.  Indeed under-pricings have been observed in many financial 
markets across countries.  Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist (1994) provide evidence of 
under-pricings of IPOs in 25 countries, highlighting lower IPO under-pricing in 
developed than in developing markets. In 2003 they update the international average 
initial returns and include data from other 13 countries including China.1 Among the 
international evidence of under-pricing, the degree of severe under-pricing in A-shares 
in China is most alarming.  
 
Many authors have provided consistent empirical evidence of under-pricing of IPO 
A-shares in China.  For example, Mok and Hui (1998) find a high initial return of 
289% for A-shares in Shanghai Stock Exchange between 1990 and 1993.  Su and 
Fleisher (1999) find that the A-shares average initial return is astonishingly at 948.59% 
from 1986 to 1996.  Chen, Firth, and Kim (2001) find under-pricing of A-shares 
listed in the period 1991 to 1996 staggering at 335%.  Chi and Padgett (2002b) find 
                                                        
1 See Ritter’s IPO homepage: http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/publ_papers/Int.pdf 
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an average market-adjusted initial return of 129.16% in a sample of 668 IPOs from 
1996 and 2000.  And Liu and Li (2000) find an average market-adjusted initial return 
of 139.4% in a sample of 781 IPOs listed from 1991 to 1999. Chan, Wei, and Wang 
(2001) find the average initial return of A-shares between 1993 and 1998 is 178%.  
Finally Wu (2001) studies A-share IPOs listed between December 1990 and March 
2000 and finds an average market adjusted initial return of 218.33%. Figure 1 displays 
the initial returns of Chinese A-shares IPOs by year in Wu (2001).  It can be observed 
from Figure 1 that the initial returns of IPOs listed before 1993 are extremely high.  
This implies that inclusion of such IPOs contributes to the extraordinarily high initial 
returns reported by Su and Fleisher (1999), and Chen, Firth, and Kim (2001), 
respectively. 
 
However, results on the long-run performance of Chinese A-share IPOs are mixed. For 
example, Chen, Firth, and Kim (2000) find that A-share IPOs listed from 1992 to 1995 
under-perform the market after 3 years of listing.  Similarly, Gu (2003) finds that the 
68 IPOs went public in 1994 under-perform the market by 53% and 57% after 3 and 5 
years of listing respectively.  In contrast, other researchers find the opposite.  Mok 
and Hui (1998) find that the under-priced IPOs under-perform the market as a whole in 
the first 75 trading days, but out-perform the market with a few percent above zero in 
the rest of the 350 holding days; whereas those over-priced IPOs also under-perform 
the market in the first 20 trading days, but enjoy high excess returns in the rest of the 
350 holding days.  In addition, Chi and Padgett (2002a) find that A-share IPOs listed 
in 1996 and 1997 out-perform the market by 10.26% after 3 years of listing.   
 
Essentially there are two categories of theoretical models developed to explain the 
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under-pricing of IPOs in general.  One is based on the assumption of asymmetric 
information, and the other on symmetric information.  The former includes signaling 
model, winner’s curse model, and principal-agent model.  Allen and Faulhaber (1989), 
Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), Welch (1989), and Chemmanur (1993) employ signaling 
models to account for the high initial returns of IPOs, assuming that issuers have 
superior information on security value than do the underwriters or investors.  High 
quality IPOs under-price the new issues in order to signal their high quality to 
investors.  In the winner’s curse model developed by Rock (1986) and Beatty and 
Ritter (1986), investors are assumed to be more informed than issuers and are 
differentially informed among themselves.  To induce investors to subscribe shares 
and thus ensure the issue success, it is optimal for the issuer to under-price his IPO.  
Baron (1982) constructs the principal-agent model to offer an alternative explanation 
for IPO under-pricing.  His theory assumes that issuers are less informed than 
underwriters.  The issuer under-prices IPO in order to induce the underwriter to put in 
the requisite effort to market shares.  
 
These well-established models have been applied to the markets in China as well.  
Previous researches try to explain the severe under-pricing of Chinese A-share IPOs by 
testing the three asymmetric information models.  For instance, nine studies 2 
examine the relationship between under-pricing and ownership retained by issuer.  It 
is hypothesized to be negative in the signaling model.  Five obtain the expected 
negative relationship, while four do not.  In addition, Chen, Firth, and Kim (2001), 
Chi and Padgett (2000b), Su and Fleisher (1999), and Wu (2001) examine the 
                                                        
2 Chan, Wei, and Wang (2001), Chau, Ciccotello, and Grant (1999), Chen, Firth, and 
Kim (2001), Chi and Padgett (2002b), Gu (2003), Mok and Hui (1998), Su (1999), Su 
and Fleisher (1999), and Wu (2001). 
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relationship between under-pricing and seasoned equity offerings.  All the three 
except Chi and Padgett (2000b) obtain the expected positive relationship.  
 
Moreover, ten studies3 test the winner’s curse model by investigating the relationship 
between under-pricing and ballot ratio (reciprocal of oversubscription rate), and/or the 
relationship between under-pricing and ex-ante uncertainty about the value of an issue.  
If there exists the winner’s curse in IPO markets in China, the former relationship 
should be negative, and the later positive.  The variables used to measure ex-ante 
uncertainty include firm size, IPO size (proceeds from IPO or number of shares issued), 
firm age, and market risk around offering of IPO.  These studies find broadly 
consistent negative relationship between under-pricing and ballot ratio, negative 
relationship between under-pricing and IPO size, and positive relationship between 
under-pricing and market risk around offering of IPO.  However, results concerning 
the relationship between under-pricing and firm size and firm age are mixed.  In short, 
these studies do not agree on whether the winner’s curse model is supported.  More 
recently, Wu (2001) test the principal-agent model by examining the relationship 
between under-pricing and reputation of underwriter.  His results do not support the 
principal-agent model. 
 
Several studies are conducted to investigate the high initial returns of A-share using 
fundamental characteristics of the IPO market in China.  For example, Chan, Wei, 
and Wang (2001), Chen, Firth, and Kim (2001), Mok and Hui (1998), and Wu (2001) 
find a positive relationship between the under-pricing and the time lag from offering to 
listing.  And Chi and Padgett (2002b), Gu (2003), and Liu and Li (2000) attribute the 
                                                        
3 Liu and Li (2000) and the nine researches under Footnote 1. 
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severe under-pricing to the high demand for IPOs and limited investment opportunities 
of Chinese investors.  However, Gu (2003) does not provide empirical evidence for 
his conclusion.  Evidence offered by Liu and Li (2000) and Chi and Padgett (2002b) 
include the negative relationship between under-pricing and ballot ratio, thereby 
supporting the winner’s curse model.  Moreover, Gu (2003) also claims that the 
bribery hypothesis contributes to the high initial returns of A-share IPOs.  This is 
because managers and employees of the issuing companies are eligible to buy a 
portion of the initial offerings.  As such, they have incentives to under-price the new 
issue for personal gains at the expense of the government.  But Su and Fleisher (1999) 
argue that bribery may be a by-product of under-pricing. 
 
1.2 Objectives 
In summary, it seems that asymmetric information models do not provide convincing 
explanations for the severe under-pricing of A-share IPOs in China. In fact, Ritter and 
Welch (2002) deem it unlikely that asymmetric information theories explain more than 
a few percent of IPO under-pricing.  In this thesis, we adopt the methodology of 
comparable firm multiples by Kim and Ritter (1999) and Purnanandam and 
Swaminathan (2001) and focus on the valuation of IPOs in China.  We find that 
A-share IPOs are severely under-valuated by issuers and underwriters at the offer.  
But investors over-value these IPOs on the listing day. Hence, both the under-valuation 
by issuers and underwriters, and the over-valuation by investors contribute to the 
severe under-pricing of IPOs. We also try to explain the severe under-pricing using 
absolute value of IPO, relative value of IPO, and other fundamental characteristics of 
IPO and the market. We find some support for the conclusion that institutional 
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characteristics and absolute value of IPO explain some part of the cross-sectional 
variations of under-pricing. But relative values are critical determinants of the severe 
under-pricing of A-share IPOs. 
 
In this thesis we also investigate the relation of government regulation of offering price 
and under-pricing. Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist (1994) find a positive relation 
between average initial returns and the degree of government interference, and thus 
conclude that relaxing government regulation of offering price should result in lower 
initial returns of IPO. But our results are on the opposite. The average market-adjusted 
initial returns of IPOs issued with and without government regulation of offering price 
are 130.32% and 152.76%, respectively, indicating that relaxing government 
regulation of offering price increases under-pricing of IPO. We propose a relative 
value theory to explain this seeming abnormal result.  
 
1.3 Organization 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. The next chapter highlights some 
institutional background of the IPO market in China.  Chapter 3 describes the data 
and the IPO valuation methodology.  Chapter 4 presents empirical findings and ranks 
performance of price multiples in valuating IPOs.  Chapter 5 reports results on initial 
returns and long-run performance of IPOs.  Chapter 6 explores the determinants of 






Market Characteristics  
 
In this chapter we highlight some unique features of the emerging securities market in 
China pertaining to under-pricing of IPOs. 
  
2.1 Types of Shares 
Since their inception in early 1990’s, Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange (SZSE) are the two national exchanges to absorb and control capital 
for state owned enterprises (SOE), thereby improving their management and 
profitability. In the last decade, the Chinese government has introduced 5 different 
types of shares SHSE and SZSE to raise money and to retain control over listed 
companies.  These include government shares, legal entity shares, employee shares, 
A-shares, and B-shares. Government shares are owned by the State Assets 
Management Bureau (SAMB) and are non-tradable; Legal entity shares can only be 
held by other SOEs or the foreign partners of a Sino-foreign joint venture and are also 
non-tradable; Employee shares are issued to employees of IPO companies and 
prevented from being traded for a certain period of time (usually one year), and once 
employee shares are listed, they become the same as A-shares; A-shares are tradable 
common shares that can be held only by Chinese citizens; B shares are tradable only to 
foreign investors. From 1993, the CSRC (China Security Regulatory Committee) 
allows companies that satisfy certain requirements to issue shares on Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange and other foreign exchanges. These shares are called H-shares and N-shares, 
respectively. 
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2.2 Listing Procedure  
One notable characteristic of the Chinese IPO market is the unique selection process of 
listing companies. Based on economic development plan and other (even political and 
military) factors, the State Council Securities Committee (SCSC), the State Planning 
Commission (SPC), and the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) jointly determine total 
IPO quotas each year.  The quota is allocated to individual provinces, municipalities, 
ministries in consideration of regional needs, regional development goals and 
provincial differences in production structure. Within each regional quota, the local 
securities authorities invite enterprises to request a listing and then make a selection 
based on factors including perceived financing needs, previous operating performance, 
regional and national development objectives, societal concerns, and even personal 
relationships of enterprise management with government officials.  However, the 
annual IPO quota was cancelled by the CSRC on March 17, 2001.  Since then any 
firm that satisfies the requirements4 stipulated in the Company Law and Securities 
Law may apply for listing. 
 
2.3 Long Time Lag between Offering and Listing of IPO 
The usual time lag between offering and listing of A-share IPOs is alarmingly long. 
For example, the average time lag reported by Wu (2001) is 350.76 days, which is 
much longer than the short duration ranging from a few days to a few weeks in the 
                                                        
4 The requirements include: a. The firm must make profits in the past three years; b. 
capital stock must exceed 50 million RMB; c. at least 25% of capital stock (15% for 
firms whose capital stock exceed 400 million RMB) should be sold to the public; d. no 
manipulation of accounts in the past 3 years.   
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developed stock markets.  Before 1993, the time lag could even be more than 3 years 
(See Chen, Firth, and Kim (2001), and Mok and Hui (1998)).  It declines to less than 
2 months since 1994. 
 
2.4 High Demand for A-share IPO  
The high demand for A-share IPOs may be caused by two major factors. One is due to 
the limited aggregate supply of IPOs as the supply is controlled by the government 
through the annual quota of IPO. The other can be explained by the shortage of 
alternative investment choices.  It is common knowledge that before 1990, the 
Chinese investors can only invest in bank deposits and Treasury bond since the 
domestic financial markets are poorly developed and they are refrained from investing 
oversea due to capital control of the government.  Muirin and Sommariva (1993) find 
that for the Chinese investors, the real returns on saving and Treasury bonds are 
actually negative because of the relatively high inflation rate. Hence, it is not 
surprising that many investors shift to holding securities for the expected higher 
returns after the establishment of Shanghai Stock and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in 
the early 1990’s.   
 
2.5 Allocation Methods 
In what follows we provide detailed information on the allocation methods of A-share 
IPOs since they are very different from those used in the developed markets and have 
undergone much change since early 1990’s. 
 
Basically a fixed pricing system was used to determine the offer prices of most A-share 
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IPOs. Under the fixed price mechanism, issuers and underwriters decide a fixed offer 
price months before the listing and there is no feedback mechanism to adjust the offer 
price. As required by the China Security Regulatory Committee (CSRC), the offer price 
should be based on the following formula: 
 
                      Offer price = EPS * P/E, 
 
where P/E stands for the ratio of price over earnings per share, and EPS is earnings per 
share. Note that the P/E ratios of most IPOs are usually set between 13 and 15 times 
according to regulations of the CSRC, with some exceptions specially approved by the 
CSRC.  
 
Computations of EPS have undergone several substantial changes. Before 1996, EPS 
was based on forecasted earnings per share. On December 26, 1996, the CSRC 
published a notice which changed EPS to be based on the realized arithmetic average 
EPS in the past three years, that is EPSt = (EPSt-1 + EPSt-2 + EPSt-3)/3. On   
September 10, 1997, the CSRC changed the EPS calculation formula to: EPS = 0.7 * 
EPS in the year before the IPO + 0.3 * Forecasted EPS during the IPO year.  In 
addition, on March 17, 1998, the CSRC further changed the EPS calculation formula 
to: EPS = Forecasted Earnings/(Total number of shares before IPO + Number of IPO 
shares*(12-month)/12), where ‘month’ is the month when IPO is offered. 
  
As regards the allocation mechanism, the lottery and pro rata mechanisms have been 
adopted. Conceivably the former allocates shares issued by lot and the latter allocates 
shares by pro rata. The difference lies in how shares are allocated in case of 
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over-subscription.  But different lottery systems were adopted during different 
periods.  For example, in 1991 and 1992, a lottery system based on fixed number of 
application forms was used. Under this arrangement, each investor was allowed to 
purchase a limited number of lottery forms, and the lottery winners were entitled to a 
certain number of shares per winning form.  On August 18, 1993 CSRC introduced 
two other lottery systems, one based on unlimited number of application forms and the 
other on unlimited number of special savings deposit certificates. Unlimited number of 
application forms and special savings deposit certificates were supplied, respectively, 
to investors to subscribe, and shares were allocated by lot.  Moreover, the CSRC’s 
October 20, 1995 notice recommended a lottery system based on quantity bids, where 
investors were required to open and save enough money in special saving accounts and 
could bid for shares affordable by the saving deposits. This system has been widely 
used since 1995. 
 
Owing to the extremely high returns, investors were very eager to subscribe to IPOs.  
In order to direct investors to the secondary securities market, the CSRC published a 
notice on February 13, 2000, allowing issuers and underwriters to allocate half of the 
issued shares to current secondary securities market investors. This was under a fixed 
price lottery mechanism and shares were allocated by lot in case of over-subscription. 
In year 2000, 35 out of 137 A-share IPOs adopted this allocation mechanism. But it 
ceased operation after 2000 for technical problems.  On 20 May 2002, the CSRC 
published a notice to resume this mechanism and adjust the percentage that could be 
allocated to the secondary securities market investors from 50% to 100%.  In practice, 




Furthermore, two pro rata mechanisms were introduced by the CSRC on 16 December 
1996.  Investors were required to save enough money to subscribe shares in special 
accounts.  And IPO shares were allocated pro rata in case of over-subscription.  
These two pro rata mechanisms were widely adopted in 1996 and 1997, but were 
never used after 1998. 
 
Alternatively several auctions were experimented in 1994 and 1995. Issuers and 
underwriters set an initial price and investors were required to bid for both price and 
quantity. The final offer price was set at the level where the accumulative quantities 
demanded by investors were equal to the total number of new shares available.   
However, only four IPOs that were listed between June 1994 and January 1995 
adopted this auction mechanism and all their first closing market prices fell below the 
offer prices. 
 
As regards the book-building system, it was first introduced on 28 July 1999 with a 
view to allowing issuers and underwriters to set an initial offer price range and decide 
the final price after receiving feedback from investors. However, the final offer price 
must fall in the price range approved by the CSRC.  Exceptional cases were to be 
specially approved by the CSRC.  31 (3 in 1999 and 28 in 2000) issuers adopted the 
book-building system since September 21, 1999.  However, this book-building 
system ceased operation in late 2000.  Since its restoration on November 6, 2001, this 
book-building approach was used by almost all IPOs issued in 2001 and the first 5 
months in 2002 until the CSRC required issuers to allocate shares to the secondary 
market investors in May 2002.  
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Notwithstanding the cancellation of annual IPO quota and re-adoption of the 
book-building, the year 2001 witnessed another fundamental change in the Chinese 
IPO market: namely the introduction of the over-allotment option for up to 15% of the 
shares offered on September 3. Such an option has been commonly used in many 
mature securities markets. Apparently the Chinese IPO market has became more 





















Data and Methodology  
 
In this chapter we first describe the source and characteristics of our dataset, then 
summarize the steps in choosing matching firms and finally the IPO valuations based 
on comparable firm multiples. 
   
3.1 The Data  
The period under study is from January 1997 to December 1998.  Our choice of 
sample duration is to ensure proper selection of matching firms and to spare enough 
time periods to gauge the after-listing performance of IPOs of A-shares listed on SHSE 
and SZSE.  To be included in the sample, an IPO must satisfy the following criteria 
slightly adopted from Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2001): 
 
1．The IPO should have offer price higher than $1 RMB; 
2．The IPO should be a non-financial company; 
3．The IPO should have information on underwriter, allocation method, ballot ratio, 
and P/E ratio in the prospectus;  
4．The IPO should have information on revenue from main operation, operating profit, 
and net profit for the prior fiscal year; 
5．The IPO should have an appropriate matching firm in the same industry that was 
listed prior to the year when the IPO was offered. 
 
There are 312 A-share IPOs listed from 1997 to 1998. We fail to collect P/E ratios or 
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ballot ratios for 43 IPOs and fail to identify appropriate matching firms for 39 IPOs. 
As such, 230 IPOs pass our screening.  We collect matching firms’ revenue from 
main operation, operating profit and net profit data from the China Stock Market & 
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database and the remaining from the CSMAR 
database, offer prospectus and listing prospectus of IPOs, respectively.  
 
Table 1 presents summary statistics of IPOs and their matching firms. Panel A reports 
descriptive statistics of IPOs.  As can be observed, the mean and median ballot ratios 
are 1.59% and 0.75%, implying a high demand for IPOs. In addition, the mean, median, 
and standard deviation of P/E ratio are 14.66, 14.50, and 1.39 respectively. Apparently 
most issuers gauge the P/E ratio by the upper limit of the P/E ratio range set by the 
CSRC. As expected, IPOs and the matching firms have similar mean and median 
revenue from main operation, net profit, and legal entity and state ownership since 
matching firms are chosen based on these items. 
 
3.2 Choosing Matching Firms 
We adopt the matching approach of Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2001) with 
adjustments according to the context of IPOs in China.  Matching firms are selected 
based on their closeness with the IPOs in terms of revenue from main operation, net 
profit, and state and legal entity ownership5. Revenue from main operation and net 
profit are used to ensure the IPOs and matching firms have similar size and 
                                                        
5 We also try to match on industry, price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio, and state and legal 
entity ownership because P/E ratio is the most important valuation measurement by 
investors in China, although these criteria ignore the firm size. The IPO valuations are 
quite similar with the results based on the matching criteria of industry, revenue from 
main operation, net profit, and state and legal entity ownership. 
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profitability, respectively. We use state and legal entity ownership as a matching 
criterion because they are non-tradable and account for the majority of A-shares, and 
therefore affect stock price. Price of tradable shares can be several times of 
non-tradable shares in China stock markets and therefore allowing non-tradable shares 
to sell on secondary market is always a sensitive pricing issue. But we do not match 
the price-to-forecasted earnings multiple for two reasons.  First, Chen and Firth (1999) 
show that profits forecast in the offer prospectuses are only moderately accurate 
although better than time series extrapolations of historical profits.  Second, the 
CSMAR database doesn’t contain forecasted profits.   
 
Steps in choosing a matching firm for each IPO in our sample are briefly described as 
follows.  First, we collect information on revenue from main operation, net profit, and 
state and legal entity ownership of the IPO from its offer prospectus and the CSMAR 
database. Then we locate the corresponding industry peers listed before the year when 
the IPO was offered from the CSMAR database.  The CSMAR adopts the CSRC’s 
industry classification in 20016.  At last, we collect information on revenue from 
main operation, net profit, and state and legal entity ownership for all the industry 
peers and select an appropriate matching firm based on its closeness with the IPO in 
terms of these three items. As Kim and Ritter (1999) and Purnanandam and 
Swaminathan (2001) we do not set numeric criteria in selecting match firms. We 
choose the best comparable firm subjectively from the pool of industry peers based on 
its closeness with the IPO in terms of revenue from main operation, net profit, and 
state and legal entity ownership. 
                                                        
6 Prior researches use the 5-industry (Shanghai Stock Exchange) and 6-industry 




3.3 IPO Valuation Using Price Multiples 
For each IPO firm, we compute 3 price-to-value (P/V) ratios based on the offer price 
(P) and fair values (V) computed from matching firm’s market multiples and IPO 
firm’s revenue from main operation, operating profit, and net profit, respectively. 
These ratios are computed by dividing the IPO offer price multiples by the matching 
firm’s market multiples. That is, 
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RMO refers to revenue from main operation. OP refers to operating profit. NP refers to 
net profit.  Offer price multiples for IPOs are computed as follows: 
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Shares Outstanding refers to shares outstanding after the issuance of IPO. Prior Fiscal 
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Year refers to the year before the offer year of IPO. The price multiples for matching 
firm are computed as below: 
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Market Price and Shares outstanding refer to closing price and shares outstanding of 

















Valuation and Accuracy  
 
In this chapter we value the IPOs using comparable firm price multiples and rank the 
price multiples based on their valuation accuracy. 
 
4.1 IPO Valuation 
Table 2 summarizes the IPO valuations based on price multiples with 230 samples.  
Overall, our results show that A-share IPOs are severely under-valued. Panel A 
presents the descriptive statistics of P/V ratios based on P/RMO, P/OP, and P/NP 
multiples.  The median P/V ratios based on P/RMO, P/OP, and P/NP multiples are 
0.49, 0.43, and 0.48, respectively. We also compute p-values for the Wilcoxon signed 
rank test under the null hypothesis that the median P/V is equal to 1. Unsurprisingly, 
the null hypothesis is rejected for all price multiples at the 5% level of significance.  
Moreover, Panel B of Table 2 presents the correlation among P/V ratios based on 
P/RMO, P/OP, and P/NP multiples. All the correlations are positive but weak 
(correlation coefficients are all below 0.4). It implies that valuations based on P/RMO, 
P/OP, and P/NP multiples are at variance. 
 
In order to check the robustness of our findings, we conduct various valuation studies 
among different exchanges (SHSE and SZSE) and between two main classifications of 
firms, namely technology and non-technology. Technology firms are those belong to 
Electronics Manufacturing, Medicine and Biological Products Manufacturing, 
Information Technology, Motion Picture and Sound Recording, Radio, Film, and 
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Television, and Information Services in the CSRC’s industry classifications (2001). 
The rest are regarded as non-technology.  We find little differences of P/V ratios 
among stock exchanges and technology and non-technology firms under all price 
multiples. 
 
We also try to identify matching firms using two alternative criteria: industry, revenue 
from main operation, operating profit and net profit, and industry, earnings per share 
and state and legal entity ownership. We include earning per share, rather than the net 
profit, in the later criteria because price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio is the most important 
valuation measurement by investors in China. IPO valuations based on the first criteria 
are almost the same as Figure 2a and therefore are not reported here. Table 4 
summarizes the IPO valuations based on the later matching criteria. Note that the mean 
P/V ratios are higher than those in Figure 2a respectively, but the median P/V ratios 
are quite similar. Like in Figure 2a, the hypotheses that median P/V ratios are equal to 
1 are all rejected. That is, the conclusion that IPOs are under-valued by issuers and 
investors at offering is still held. 
 
Undervaluation of IPOs by issuers and underwriters may be attributed to the offering 
price regulation of the CSRC which stipulates that the offer price should be set around 
15 times of earning per share of the issuing firm. In other words, issuers and 
underwriters are forced to undervalue the IPOs. We address this issue by valuing IPOs 
that are issued without the offering price regulation of the CSRC. The CSRC cancelled 
the offering price regulation from March 2000 to August 2001. Totally 190 A-share 
IPOs were issued during this period and we are able to identify appropriate matching 
firms for 167 of them based on industry, net profit, and state and legal entity 
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ownership. The mean and median P/E ratios of the 167 IPOs are 34.26 and 33.29 
respectively, much higher than that of IPOs listed in 1997 and 1998. As can be 
observed in Table 5, these IPOs are also undervalued. Median P/V ratios are 0.46, 0.45, 
and 0.51 respectively, and p-values for the Wilcoxon signed rank test are low enough 
to reject the null hypothesis that P/V ratios are equal to 1. As such, we conclude that 
IPOs are undervalued by the issuers and underwriters, not by the government 
regulation on offering price. 
 
Although these IPOs are undervalued at offering with respect to their A-share peers, 
they are overvalued comparing with their own B-share market price. Among the 312 
A-share IPOs listed in 1997 and 1998, 8 IPOs also issue B-shares before. In our 
sample of 230 IPOs, six firms issue B-shares prior to the A-share IPOs. If we regard 
their B-share price as their value, the mean and median P/V ratios for the six IPOs are 
1.34 and 1.27 respectively. In fact, five of the six IPOs are overvalued and only one is 
slightly undervalued with respect to their B-share price. The results are not surprising 
since it is well-known that A-share stock market is characterized with high speculation 
and there is a large difference between A- and B-share market valuations. As such, we 
conclude that A-share IPOs are undervalued based on their A-share market peers, but 
are overvalued with respect to the B-share market.     
 
In addition, we investigate the relationships between P/V ratios and P/E ratios and 
ballot ratios with respect three types of portfolios: high P/V portfolio, medium P/V 
portfolio, and low P/V portfolio.  IPOs are sorted by P/V ratios and we allot the first 
77 IPOs with the highest P/V ratios to the high P/V portfolio, the last 77 IPOs with the 
lowest P/V ratios to the low P/V portfolio, and the rest to the medium P/V portfolio.  
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Table 6 reports P/E ratios and ballot ratios for these three P/V portfolios. We skip 
results for the P/V portfolios based on the P/RMO price multiple because it performs 
the worst among the three multiples.  We also perform the nonparametric Wilcoxson 
signed rank test to check the equality of medians. P/V ratios are expected to be 
positively correlated with P/E ratios in the prospectuses since P/E ratio is a commonly 
used valuation indicator. Also, P/V ratios are expected to be positively correlated with 
ballot ratios since investors tend to pick severely under-valued IPOs for higher returns.  
Surprisingly, we find small difference in P/E ratios and ballot ratios between the low 
P/V portfolio and high P/V portfolio.  However, p-values for the Wilcoxson signed 
rank test are very high (greater than 0.10).  Apparently there are no evidence to 
support that P/V ratios are positively correlated with P/E ratios in prospectuses and 
ballot ratios. 
   
Note that the standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis of P/V ratios based on P/OP 
multiple are much smaller than those based on P/RMO and P/NP multiples. In addition, 
correlation between P/V ratios based on P/RMO and P/NP multiples (0.13) is much 
lower than their correlations with P/V ratios based on P/OP multiple (0.28 and 0.32 
respectively). A valid concern is that does P/OP multiple perform better than the other 
two multiples in IPO valuation? We address this issue as follows.    
 
4.2 Valuation Accuracy 
To compare valuation adequacy of the price multiples, we first compute 3 
price-to-value ratios (P/V) for each IPO based on its first closing market price (P) and 
fair values (V) computed from matching firm’s market multiples and IPO firm’s 
revenue from main operation, operating profit, and net profit, respectively. These 3 
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ratios are similar to those computed based on offer price: 
 











⎡                        (4)  











⎡                           (5) 











⎡                           (6) 
 
The first closing market price multiples for IPOs are computed as follows: 
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Shares Outstanding refers to shares outstanding on the listing day of IPO. Prior Fiscal 
Year refers to the year before the year when IPO is listed. The price multiples for 
matching firm are computed as below: 
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Market Price and Shares outstanding refer to closing price and shares outstanding of 
the matching firm on the listing day of IPO.  
 
Valuation errors for each IPO are computed in order to rank the performance of these 
price multiples.  We follow Kaplan and Ruback (1995) and Kim and Ritter (1999), 
and define valuation errors as the natural logarithm of the inverse of P/V ratios. For 
example, valuation error of the P/OP multiple is log(V/P)OP, which is the difference 
between log(P/OP)Match and log(P/OP)IPO.  Panel A of Table 7 displays valuation 
errors of the price multiples. Both mean and median valuation errors for the P/RMO, 
P/OP, and P/NP multiples are significantly different from zero at the 5% level. We also 
report the absolute prediction errors and the percentage of valuation errors within 15% 
in Panel B of Table 7. The percentage of valuation errors within 15% is computed as 
|log(V/P)|≤15%. The mean absolute valuation error for the P/NP price multiple is only 
35%, the lowest among our three multiples. The percentage of valuation errors within 
15% for the P/OP price multiple is of the same order of magnitude as that for P/NP, 
and both are considerably higher than that for P/RMO.  Such a battery of evidence 
indicates that the P/NP multiple performs the best, followed by P/OP and P/RMO 
consecutively. The P/RMO multiple performs the worst as RMO is a measurement of 
sales, not earnings which are often used by practitioners.  Our findings are consistent 





Chapter 5  
Under-pricing and Long-Run Performance 
 
In this chapter we report results on under-pricing and long-run performance of A-share 
IPOs. We also try to explain the severe under-pricing using valuation results at 
offering and listing. 
 
5.1 Under-pricing 
It is well known that Chinese A-share IPOs earn tremendous returns on the listing day. 
Consistently our results show that the A-share IPOs are severely under-valued. In 
addition, we observe that the mean offer price-to-value ratios based on P/RMO, P/OP 
and P/NP multiples are 0.56, 0.45, and 0.52, which are significantly less than 1.  As 
such, the phenomenon of severe under-pricing may be caused by the under-valuation 
of IPOs.  If it is the case, IPOs that are most under-valued should earn the highest 
first-day returns. In other words,   the lower the offer price-to-value ratios, the higher 
the first-day returns. We shall test this hypothesis by examining the relationship 
between P/V ratios and the first-day returns.   
 
We compute the first-day return of IPO relative to the SHSE/SZSE A-share prices and 
indices using the following standard ratio: 
                













=               (7)     
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PMarket and POffer are first closing market price and offer price of IPO respectively. 
IMarket is the A-share index of the exchange market where the IPO is listed on the 
listing day of IPO. IOffer is the A-share index prior to the offer date of IPO. The 
nonparametric Wilcoxson signed rank test is used to test the null hypothesis of equality 
of medians. The t-test is used to check whether the low P/V portfolio and the high P/V 
portfolio have the same mean. 
 
The median and mean initial returns for our entire sample are 125.80% and 139.24% 
respectively. It is consistent with Chan, Wei, and Wang (2001), Wu (2001), and Chi 
and Padgett (2002b). Differences between the median initial returns for the low P/V 
portfolio and high P/V portfolio based on the P/OP and P/NP multiples are 37.75% and 
43.98% respectively, and are significantly greater than zero under the Wilcoxon signed 
rank test. Differences between the mean initial returns are even larger and also 
significantly greater than zero.  As such, our findings support the null hypothesis that 
undervaluation causes under-pricing. 
 
We have shown that under-valuation by issuer and underwriter is a source of 
under-pricing. We expect that high demand may be another factor that affects 
under-pricing of A-share IPOs since it is regarded as a source of under-pricing of IPO 
in Chi and Padgett (2002b) and Gu (2003).  We investigate this conjecture by 
computing the first closing market price-to-value ratios of IPOs (computed from 
formulas (4), (5), and (6)). If investors over-value IPOs, the first closing market 
price-to-value ratios should be greater than 1.  Table 8 presents the results for P/V 
ratios on the listing day of IPOs.  The t-test is used to check the null hypothesis that 
the mean is equal to 1, and the Wilcoxon signed rank test to check whether the median 
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is equal to 1.  
 
As can be observed from Table 8, the mean and median P/V ratios based on the P/OP 
multiple are 1.06 and 0.95 respectively, and we fail to reject the null hypotheses that 
they are equal to 1. In contrast, we reject the hypotheses that mean and median P/V 
ratios based on the P/RMO and P/NP multiples are equal to 1.  The percentages of 
P/V ratios that are greater than 1 for the P/RMO and P/NP multiples are roughly 60%, 
but that for the P/OP price multiple is only 45%. As such, these three price multiples 
do not agree on whether investors over-react on the listing day of IPO.  We 
recommend findings based on the P/NP price multiple since it performs the best in 
valuating IPOs.  As such, we may conclude that under-valuation by issuers and 
underwriters and over-valuation by investors jointly contributes to the severe 
under-pricing of A-share IPOs. 
 
5.2 Long-run Performance 
While investors overvalue A-share IPOs on the listing day, they may become rational 
enough and value IPOs based on the fundamentals in the long-run. We test this 
rationality hypothesis by looking at the relationship between the first closing market 
price-to-value ratios and the cumulative buy-and-hold abnormal returns (CARs) of 
IPOs with respect to two benchmarks: the SHSE/SZSE A-share market and their 
matching firms.  The cumulative buy-and-hold returns for IPO firm i and its 
benchmark m are computed using the conventional formulas: 
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where T is the holding month, rit is the monthly buy-and-hold return of IPO, and rmt is 
the monthly return of benchmark market (value-weighted) or matching firm. rit and rmt 
are adjusted for stock dividends, stock splits, and rights offerings. We assume there are 
20 trading days for one moth. CAR is the difference between the cumulative 
buy-and-hold returns of IPO and the benchmark, i.e., 
 
                             mTiTiT RRCAR −= . 
 
CAR up to month T is computed as the mean CAR of all IPOs up to month T: 
 










where N is the number of IPOs in our sample. All the daily and monthly returns are 
collected from the CSMAR database. 
  
Table 9 reports the CARs of IPOs up to 36 months with respect to their matching firms 
and the SHSE/SZSE A-share markets.  Note that both CARs are slightly below zero 
in the first five month after listing. The market-adjusted CAR (rmt is the monthly 
market return) increases steadily after the 5th month and reaches around 30% at the end 
of the 3-year holding period. Our results are consistent with Chan, Wei, and Wang 
(2001) who also find 25% out-performance of IPOs with respect to the market after 36 
months of listing.  
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However, the CARs with respect to matching firms are slightly above zero after the 5th 
month and less than zero since the 25th month. At the end of the 3-year holding period, 
IPOs under-perform their matching firms by 25%. This implies that our matching 
firms also out-perform the market as a whole because IPOs out-performe the market as 
a whole. It is because IPOs have good accounting records before their listings as 
required by the CSRC and we match IPOs on the accounting items.  As such, our 
matching firms have better profitability and outperform the market as a whole. 
 
Table 10 reports the mean values of unadjusted and adjusted CARs up to 12, 24, and 
36 holding months for IPO portfolios based on P/V ratios using the P/NP multiple on 
the listing day of IPO. Figure 3 depicts the 36-month CAR trends. In Table 10, the 
t-test is used to test the null hypothesis that means for the low and high P/V portfolios 
are equal; the alternative hypothesis is that mean for the low P/V portfolio is greater 
than that for the high P/V portfolio.  As can be observed, differences between the 
mean values of CARs for the low and high P/V portfolios are all positive.  In 
particular, the 12 and 24 months CARs with respect to matching firm are significant at 
the 10% and 5% level respectively. It is not surprising since the P/V ratios are 
computed using values based on matching firms. The positive difference between 
mean values of CARs for the low and high P/V portfolios imply that under-valued 
IPOs with low P/V ratios on the listing day outperform those over-valued IPOs with 






Causes of Under-pricing of IPOs 
 
In the previous chapters we find that severe undervaluation by issuers and 
overvaluation by investors jointly cause IPOs in China to be severely under-priced. In 
this chapter we use several variables including the P/V ratios to explain the 
cross-sectional variations of under-pricing. The period under study is from January 
1997 to December 2001. There are 626 A-share IPOs listed from 1997 to 2001 and 523 
IPOs pass our screening.  
 
6.1 Possible Reasons for Under-pricing 
The following variables are widely used as possible reasons for IPO under-pricing. 
The first variable is LAG, the number of days between the offer date and listing date. 
The usual time lag between offering and listing of A-share IPOs is much longer than 
the duration ranging from a few days to a few weeks in the developed stock markets. 
The long time lag increases the investors’ risk and thus high initial return is required. 
Therefore, a positive relation between LAG and under-pricing is hypothesized. 
 
The second variable is SUB, the subscription rate. The higher the subscription rate, the 
higher the demand for the IPO shares. Therefore, we expect a positive relation between 
SUB and under-pricing. 
 
The third variable is RTN, the percent of shares retained by the state and legal entities. 
High retention rate of the state and legal entities may decrease the IPO firm’s value 
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because the objective of state-owned firms may not be maximizing shareholders’ 
wealth. Also, government intervention may negatively affect firm’s profitability. 
Therefore, we expect a negative relation between RTN and under-pricing. 
 
The fourth variable is RMO, revenue from main operation of IPO in the year prior to 
offering. It is a proxy for firm size. Small firms face higher risks than large firms do 
and thus high initial return is required. Therefore, we expect a negative relation 
between RMO and under-pricing. 
 
The fifth variable is TECH, a dummy variable which is equal to one if the IPO is a 
technology firm. Technology firms are those belong to Electronics Manufacturing, 
Medicine and Biological Products Manufacturing, Information Technology, Motion 
Picture and Sound Recording, Radio, Film, and Television, and Information Services 
in the CSRC’s industry classifications (2001). The rest are regarded as non-technology. 
75 IPOs in the sample are technology firms. Technology firms face higher risks than 
non-technology firms do and thus high initial return is required. Therefore, we expect 
high under-pricing for technology firms. 
 
The sixth variable is EXCH, a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the IPO is listed 
on SZSE. This variable is used to capture the difference of under-pricing in SZSE and 
SHSE. 
 
The seventh variable is PE, the P/E ratio in the offering prospectus. It is a commonly 
used indicator of the value of IPO. Here we call it ‘absolute value’ of IPO because it is 
based on the profitability of the IPO itself, not on the value of the comparable firm. We 
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expect a negative relation between under-pricing and PE. 
 
The eighth variable is PELMT, a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the IPO is offered 
under the regulation of offering price. The government regulation of offering price was 
imposed since the foundations of stock exchanges in China and ceased to be used 
during the period from March 2000 to August 2001. The P/E ratios of most IPOs are 
set at 13-17 times under the regulation. 174 IPOs in our sample were issued in the 
period when the regulation was abolished. The mean and median P/E ratios of these 
IPOs are 34.31 and 33.43, respectively, which are much higher than that of IPOs 
issued under the regulation (15.42 and 15, respectively). Issuers have to offer lower 
prices in order to keep to the regulation. Therefore, we expect that the regulation of 
offering price increases the under-pricing. 
 
The next three variables are PVRMOO, PVOPO, and PVNPO, which are P/V ratios at 
the offering based on P/RMO, P/OP, and P/NP multiples, respectively. They are 
relative values of IPO for issuers. The market price will be much higher than the offer 
price if the P/V ratios are low and the market is effective. Therefore, we expect 
negative relations between under-pricing and PVRMOO, PVOPO, and PVNPO. 
 
The last three variables are PVRMOL, PVOPL, and PVNPL, which denote P/V ratios 
on the listing day based on P/RMO, P/OP, and P/NP multiples, respectively. They are 
relative values of IPO for investors. Keeping the relative values for issuers fixed, the 
initial returns will be higher if the relative values for investors are higher. Therefore, 




6.2 Empirical Analysis 
Table 11 presents the summary statistics for IPO under-pricing and the variables we 
use to explain the cross-sectional variations of under-pricing. Under-pricing is greater 
than 100% in the sample period. It is the lowest in 1999 and highest in 2000. The mean 
and median initial returns of all IPOs in this sample are 137.78% and 125.68, 
respectively. Figure 4 graphs under-pricing of IPOs of different categories. We can see 
that (1) under-pricing of IPOs without regulation of offering price is lower than that of 
those with regulation, (2) under-pricing of technology IPOs is about 50 points higher 
than that of non-technology IPOs, and (3) there is very tiny difference between 
under-pricing of IPOs listed on SHSE and SZSE. 
 
LAG, the number of days between offering and listing, increases from 1997 to 1999 
and then declines. The median subscription rates are 91.42, 238.84, 235.02, 359.03, 
and 327.96 in the five years, respectively, indicating a trend of increase. The mean and 
median P/E ratios are much higher in 2000 and 2001 than in the other three years due 
to the abolishment of regulation of offering price from March 2000 to August 2001. 
The median percent of shares retained by the state and legal entities (RTN) is stable 
and around 60-70% in our sample period which indicates that most shares of listed 
IPOs are non-negotiable.  
 
The mean and median relative values for issuers (PVRMOO, PVOPO, and PVNPO) 
are stable in the sample period. It is surprising that relative values for issuers are not 
significantly higher in 2000 and 2001 than in the other three years since the issuers are 
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allowed to set their offer prices as high as possible from March 2000 to August 2001. 
It is possible that IPOs issued in 2000 and 2001 under the regulation of offering price 
reduce the mean and median relative values for issuers in these two years. However, 
we find that relative values for issuers do not differ much between IPOs with and 
without the regulation. In Table 13 we can see that only the difference in PVOPO is 
significant between IPOs with and without the regulation. It implies that issuers set the 
offer prices so as to keep the relative values consistent with other IPOs. 
 
The mean and median relative values for investors (PVRMOL, PVOPL, and PVNPL) 
differ much across years. In Table 11, we can see that PVOPL and PVNPL are higher 
in 2000 and 2001 than in the other three years, and accordingly in Table 13 we find 
that the coefficients on PELMT are significant when PVOPL and PVNPL are regressed 
on a constant and PELMT. However, there is not significant difference of PVRMOL 
between IPOs with and without regulation of offering price.  
 
We use the variables described above to explain the cross-sectional variations of IPO 
under-pricing in China from 1997-2001. Four regression models are constructed. The 
first model only includes the institutional characteristic variables (LAG, SUB, RTN, 
RMO, TECH, and EXCH). The second model adds the variable of IPO value (PE) and 
PELMT to the first model. The third model includes all the variables including the 
relative values of IPO for issuers (PVRMOO, PVOPO, and PVNPO) and for investors 
(PVRMOL, PVOPL, and PVNPL). The last model only includes variables whose 
coefficients are significant in the third model. 
 
Table 12 presents the regression results. As expected, the coefficient on RMO is 
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negative and significant (at 5%), and the coefficient on TECH is positive and 
significant. The coefficients on LAG, SUB, and RTN are of the hypothesized signs, but 
are insignificant in one or more of the first three regressions. The coefficient on EXCH 
is insignificant in all the first three regressions. In summary, there is some support for 
the idea that the institutional characteristics account for the severe under-pricing of 
A-share IPOs. 
 
The coefficients on PE and PELMT are negative and significant in all the regressions. 
It indicates that the absolute value of IPO (PE) and government regulation of offering 
price affect under-pricing. However, the low R2s of the first and second regressions 
(0.144 and 0.166, respectively) show that the institutional characteristics of IPO, 
absolute value of IPO, and government regulation of offering price are not critical 
determinants of the severe under-pricing of A-share IPOs in China.   
 
All the coefficients on the relative values for issuers (PVRMOO, PVOPO, and PVNPO) 
and relative values for investors (PVRMOL, PVOPL, and PVNPL) are significant, and 
as hypothesized the coefficients on PVRMOO, PVOPO, and PVNPO are negative and 
those on PVRMOL, PVOPL, and PVNPL are positive. Note that adding the relative 
values for issuers and investors dramatically increases the R2 to 0.662. These findings 
support the idea that relative values are critical determinants of the severe 
under-pricing of A-share IPOs.  
 
6.3 Government Regulations and Under-pricing 
Before March 2000 the price-to-earnings (PE) ratios of most A-share IPOs in China 
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were set between 13 and 17 times according to regulation of the China Security 
Regulatory Committee (CSRC), with some exceptions specially approved by the 
CSRC. This government regulation of offering price prevented the issuers from setting 
high offer price and thus may increase the first-day returns of IPO. Loughran, Ritter, 
and Rydqvist (1994) suggest that relaxing government regulation of offering price 
should result in lower under-pricing. But our results in section 6.2 are on the opposite: 
the coefficient on PELMT is negative and significant. As such, we can not attribute the 
high under-pricing of A-share IPOs in China to the government regulation of offering 
price. It is because the under-pricing is higher after relaxing the government regulation 
of offering price.  
 
Why does relaxing government regulation of offering price result in higher 
under-pricing? In what follows we propose a relative value theory to answer this 
question. Basically, the relative value theory assumes that (1) issuers and investors 
value their IPOs based on the values of their industry peers; (2) issuers set the offer 
prices so that the values of the IPOs relative to their industry peers are consistent with 
the market-wide relative value of IPO; and (3) relative value for investors fluctuates in 
bull and bear markets. The reasonableness of the these three assumptions lies in the 
facts that (1) valuing IPO using comparable firm multiples is widely recommended in 
both academic and practitioner publications; (2) the IPOs would be under-subscribed if 
the issuers ask higher relative values than the market-wide relative value because the 
investors know that returns on these IPOs are lower than the average IPO initial return 
(e.g. the market-wide relative value is 0.8; if an issuer sets the relative value at 0.9 the 
initial return on this IPO will be 12.5%, less than the 25% market initial return); and (3) 
investors are confident about the prospect of the market and expect that market price of 
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IPO will increase in bull market, and therefore increase the relative value of IPO.    
 
Our results on PVRMOO, PVNPO, PVOPL, and PVNPL do not support the relative 
value theory, but results on PVOPO and PVRMOL fit well with the assumptions of the 
relative value theory. Here we draw conclusions based on PVNP and PVNPL because 
the P/NP multiple performs the best in valuing IPO in China.  
 
In Figure 5a we see dramatic increases in the average P/E ratio after the CSRC relaxed 
the regulation of offering price in March 2000. It reflects that the issuers increased the 
‘absolute’ value of IPO. However, in Table 13 we find that the coefficient on PELMT 
is small (-0.052) and insignificant when PVNPO is regressed on a constant and 
PELMT. In Figure 5b we observe no big changes of PVNPO before and after the 
government relaxed the offer price regulations. It implies that the issuers did not 
increase the relative value of IPO after the CSRC relaxed the regulation of offering 
price in March 2000. In contrast to the issuers, the investors increased the relative 
value of IPO after the regulation was cancelled. In Table 11 the coefficient on PELMT 
is significant when PVNPL is regressed on a constant and PELMT. In Figure 6 we can 
see that both SHSE and SZSE were bull markets when the investors increased the 
relative value of IPO from March 2000 to August 2001; the SZSE and SHSE A-share 
Composite Indexes began to increase in early 2000 and decreased to their original 
values at the end of 2001 (see Figure 6). Therefore under-pricing after relaxing the 
regulation is higher since the investors increased the relative value of IPO in bull 







In this thesis, we have examined the pricing of 230 IPOs in the Chinese markets from 
1997 to 1998 using comparative firm multiples.  Consistent with findings with 
previous studies based on asymmetric models and characteristics of the Chinese 
A-share IPO market, we find that the A-share IPOs are severely under-valued by about 
50% by issuers and underwriters at the offer.  In addition, we find a positive 
relationship between magnitudes of under-valuation and initial return of IPO, thereby 
implying that under-valuation may cause under-pricing. In contrast with 
under-valuation by issuers and underwriters, we find that investors over-value IPOs on 
the listing day. Hence, we may conclude that under-valuation by issuers and 
underwriters and over-valuation by investors jointly causes the severe under-pricing of 
IPOs in China.  
 
We have also tried to explain the severe under-pricing of 523 A-share IPOs in the 
Chinese markets from 1997 to 2001 using institutional characteristics, absolute value, 
and relative value of IPO. We find some support for the conclusion that institutional 
characteristics and absolute value of IPO affect under-pricing. But relative values of 
IPO (for both issuers and investors) are critical determinants of the severe 
under-pricing of A-share IPOs in China. 
 
We also rank the performance of our price multiples using valuation errors. We find 
that the P/NP multiple performs the best, followed by P/OP and P/RMO consecutively. 
It is out of our expectation that the P/NP multiple performs better than the P/OP 
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multiple since the operating profit is a more reliable measurement of profitability than 
the net profit.  One possible caveat is that we do not use the price-to-forecasted 
profits multiple in valuating IPOs since the forecasted accounting profits data for 
matching firms are not available. 
 
In contrast with Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist (1994), we find that relaxing 
government regulation of offering price increases under-pricing. Therefore, we can not 
attribute the high under-pricing of A-share IPOs in China to the government regulation 
of offering price. We propose a relative value theory to explain why relaxing 
government regulation of offering price results in higher under-pricing. The relative 
value theory states that issuers keep the relative value of IPO stable in bull and bear 
markets but the investors increase the relative value in bull markets and decrease it in 
bear markets. Our results provide some preliminary support for this theory. Although 
the issuers kept the relative value of IPO stable, the investors increased the relative 
value of IPO due to the bull market after relaxing the regulation of offering price. 
Consequently IPO under-pricing increased. 
 
Turning to the long-run performance, we detect a 30% out-performance of IPOs with 
respect to the market after 36 months of listing. But IPOs under-perform their 
matching firms by 25% after 36 months of listing.  It implies that the matching firms 
also out-perform the market, partly due to our selection process for matching firms. 
We also find that those IPOs over-valued by investors on the listing day under-perform 
those under-valued IPOs in the long-run.  
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Figure 1: Initial Returns of Chinese A-Share IPOs by Year.  
 
Note: This chart graphs the index adjusted first-day returns of Chinese A-share IPOs 
up to 1999.  
 
Data source: Wu Jie, 2001, Short-run Performance and Valuation of IPO in China, 




































Figure 2a: P/V Ratios and Initial Returns. This chart graphs the index adjusted 
initial returns for IPO portfolios based on P/V ratios. P/V ratios are based on the P/NP 






















Figure 2b: P/V Ratios and CARs. This chart graphs the 12, 24, and 36 months 
cumulative buy-and-hold abnormal returns with respect to matching firm for three IPO 
portfolios. IPOs are allotted to three portfolios based on their P/V ratios on the listing 




















Buy-and-hold Return of IPO Market Adjusted CAR Matching Firm Adjusted CAR
 
Figure 3: Long-run Cumulative Buy-and-hold Abnormal Returns (CARs) of 
IPOs. The chart graphs the cumulative buy-and-hold returns of IPOs and buy-and-hold 

































Figure 4: Under-pricing of IPOs of Different Categories. This graph compares the 
under-pricing of IPOs with and without regulation of offering price, Tech and 


















































































Figure 5a: Monthly No. of IPOs, PE, IR, and SUB by Cohort Year. IR is the market-adjusted initial return. PE is the price-to-earnings ratio 
in the prospectus. SUB is subscription rate. 103 IPOs are not included in our sample because they either do not pass our screening or do not have 



























Figure 5b: Monthly PVNPO and PVNPL by Cohort Year. PVNPO is the P/V ratio based on P/NP multiple at offering and represents the 
issuer’s valuation of IPO relative to its industry peer. PVNPL is the P/V ratio based on P/NP multiple at listing and represents the investors’ 
valuation of IPO relative to its industry peer. 103 IPOs are not included in our sample because they either do not pass our screening or do not 




























Figure 6: SZSE and SHSE A-share Composite Index by Cohort Year. This graph depicts the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) and 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) A-share Composite Index from 1999-2001. These two indexes are computed and released by the SZSE and 




Descriptive Statistics for the IPO Sample (Sample Size=230) 
Panel A provides descriptive statistics of IPOs. P/E ratio stands for offer price/earnings per share. Ballot ratio = number of shares issued/number 
of shares subscribed. Offer price and proceeds numbers are collected from CSMAR database, and most of ballot ratio and P/E ratio numbers are 
collected from the offer prospectus and listing prospectus of IPOs, with few from http://www.cninfo.com.cn/. Panel B compares IPO firms and 
matching firms. Revenue from main operation, operating profit, and net profit numbers of matching firms are collected from the CSMAR 
database, and those of IPO firms from offer prospectus and listing prospectus of IPOs. State and legal entity ownership is collected from the 
CSMAR database. 
   
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of IPOs 
  
Variable    Mean   Median      Max      Min     Std. Dev. 
Offer Price (RMB) 6.05 6.00 15.00 3.00      1.68 
Proceeds (Millions of RMB) 336.98 256.79 2625.00 14.00    330.77 
Ballot Ratio (%) 1.59 0.75 18.66 0.0084      2.53 
P/E Ratio 14.66 14.50 23.83 10.00      1.39 
 
Panel B: Characteristics of IPO Firms and Matching Firms 
 
                  IPO Firms                           Matching Firms                
   Mean      Median       Max       Min     Std. Dev.     Mean    Median       Max        Min     Std. Dev.  
Revenue from Main Operation  
(Millions of RMB) 666.90 331.08 8513.20 16.25 1137.70 636.78 300.43 12127.00 51.72 1361.60 
Operating Profit (Millions of RMB) 85.72 50.79 920.16 9.81 119.79 62.38 40.62 885.93 2.98 90.41 
Net Profit (Millions of RMB) 71.12 44.75 614.54 2.38 87.51 59.40 45.08 726.47 8.56 73.57 




IPO Valuation based on Price Multiples (sample size is 230) 
This table reports the results of offer price-to-value (P/V) ratios. Value is computed based on market price-to-revenue from main operation 
(P/RMO), market price-to-operating profit (P/OP), and market price-to-net profit (P/NP) of a matching firm. Matching firm is selected based on 
its closeness with the IPO in terms of revenue from main operation, operating profit, and net profit. Panel A presents statistics of P/V ratios based 
on P/RMO, P/OP, and P/NP multiples. Wilcoxon p-value corresponds to the Wilcoxon signed rank test for median equal to 1. Panel B presents 
the correlation coefficients among the P/V ratios based on P/RMO, P/OP, and P/NP multiples. 
 
Panel A: P/V Ratios Based on Price Multiples 
 
                                     Std.                        Wilcoxon 
   Mean    Median   Max    Min    Dev.      Skewness  Kurtosis   p-value  
P/RMO 0.56 0.49 3.77 0.11 0.39 3.72 25.33 0.0000 
P/OP 0.45 0.43 1.33 0.06 0.20 0.80 4.18 0.0000 
P/NP 0.52 0.48 4.75 0.09 0.35 8.06 96.80 0.0000 
  
 
Panel B: Correlation among P/V Ratios 
 
  RMO      OP       NP  
RMO 1 0.28 0.13 
OP 0.28 1 0.32 












Mean P/V Ratios in Two Exchanges (SHSE and SZSE) and Two Kinds of Firms (Technology and Non-Technology) 
This table reports the mean offer price-to-value (P/V) ratios in different exchanges and firms. Technology firms refer to Electronics 
Manufacturing, Medicine and Biological Products Manufacturing, Information Technology, Motion Picture and Sound Recording, Radio, Film, 
and Television, and Information Services in the CSRC’s industry classifications.  P-value corresponds to the t-test that the mean is equal to 1. 
 
 SHSE   P-value   SZSE   P-value Tech   P-value   Non-Tech   P-value 
No. of Issues 110              120          27                203               
P/RMO 0.56    0.0000    0.57    0.0000 0.57   0.0000      0.56     0.0000  
P/OP 0.43    0.0000    0.46    0.0000 0.45   0.0000      0.45     0.0000 
















IPO Valuation Using Matching Criteria of Industry, Earnings per Share, and State and Legal Entity Ownership (Sample Size is 225) 
This table reports the results of offer price-to-value (P/V) ratios under the matching criteria of industry, earnings per share, and state and legal 
entity ownership. Value is computed based on market price-to-revenue from main operation (P/RMO), market price-to-operating profit (P/OP), 
and market price-to-net profit (P/NP) of a matching firm. Matching firm is selected based on its closeness with the IPO in terms of industry, 
earnings per share, and state and legal entity ownership. Wilcoxon p-value corresponds to the Wilcoxon signed rank test for median equal to 1.  
 
Panel A: P/V Ratios Based on Price Multiples 
 
                                     Std.                        Wilcoxon 
   Mean    Median   Max    Min    Dev.      Skewness  Kurtosis   p-value  
P/RMO 0.76 0.49 6.47 0.06 0.83 3.37 18.93 0.0000
P/OP 0.52 0.44 4.75 0.03 0.46 5.50 42.71 0.0000




Panel B: Correlation among P/V Ratios 
 
  RMO      OP       NP  
RMO 1 0.30 0.22 
OP 0.30 1 0.69 











Valuation of IPOs Issued without the CSRC Regulations 
This table reports the results of offer price-to-value (P/V) ratios of IPOs issued without the CSRC offering price regulation. Value is computed 
based on market price-to-revenue from main operation (P/RMO), market price-to-operating profit (P/OP), and market price-to-net profit (P/NP) 
of a matching firm. Matching firm is selected based on its closeness with the IPO in terms of industry, net profit, and state and legal entity 
ownership. Wilcoxon p-value corresponds to the Wilcoxon signed rank test for median equal to 1.  
 
                                     Std.                        Wilcoxon 
   Mean    Median   Max    Min    Dev.      Skewness  Kurtosis   p-value  
P/RMO 0.57 0.46 2.37 0.13 0.39 1.75 6.74 0.0000
P/OP 0.61 0.45 3.85 0.05 0.53 3.07 15.60 0.0000





















IPO Portfolios Based on P/V Ratios, P/E Ratios, Ballot Ratios, and Initial Return 
This table reports P/E ratios, ballot ratios and initial return for the three IPO portfolios based on P/V ratios. Results for P/V ratios based on the 
P/OP and P/NP multiples are presented. P/E ratios are those in the prospectuses. Initial return (IR) is the first-day return of IPO relative to 
SHSE/SZSE index. The numbers in parentheses for differences in median are p-values corresponding to the Wilcoxon signed rank test; those for 









IPO Portfolio No. of 
Issues 
                  Based on P/OP                     
 Median    Median  Median Ballot  Median   Mean    
P/V Ratio  P/E Ratio    Ratio (%)   IR (%)    IR (%) 
                  Based on P/NP                       
 Median   Median   Median Ballot  Median    Mean    
P/V Ratio  P/E Ratio   Ratio (%)    IR (%)     IR (%) 
Low P/V 77   0.26      14.50       0.79      146.51    163.82   0.32       14.50      0.80      144.16     166.42  
Medium P/V 76   0.43      14.74       0.73      126.23    145.07   0.48       14.65      0.62      135.76     146.15 
High P/V  77   0.62      14.50       0.70      108.76    108.91   0.69       14.50      0.79      100.19     105.24 
    
Low P/V – High P/V               0         0.09       37.75     54.91           (0.3483)    (0.6206)     (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
              0        0.01       43.98      61.18    
           (0.1191)   (0.3729)    (0.0000)    (0.0000)  
    






This table presents valuation errors. Valuation errors are measured as the natural logarithm of the inverse of P/V ratios. We also report the 
absolute valuation errors and the percentage of prediction errors within 15%. The percentage of valuation errors within 15% is computed as 
|log(V/P)|≤15%. T-test p-value corresponds to test for mean equal to 0. Wilcoxon p-value corresponds to the Wilcoxon signed rank test for 
median equal to 0. 
 
 
Panel A: Valuation Errors 
 
                                 Std.     T-test    Wilcoxon 
  Mean  Median   Max    Min   Dev.     p-value    p-value   
P/RMO -0.10 -0.10 1.31 -2.82 0.56 0.0076  0.0129 
P/OP 0.09 0.05 2.07 -2.32 0.55 0.0102  0.0356 
P/NP -0.06 -0.11 2.05 -2.38 0.46 0.0352  0.0048 
 
Panel B: Absolute Valuation Errors 
                                        Percentage 
                                      of Valuation 
                               Std.    Errors within 
 Mean  Median  Max    Min   Dev.     15% (%)     
P/RMO  0.43 0.35 2.82 0.0002  0.37       20.43 
P/OP 0.40 0.30 2.32 0.0037  0.38       27.83 








P/V Ratios on the Listing Day of IPO (sample size=230) 
This table reports results of first closing market price-to-value (P/V) ratios computed based on market price-to-revenue from main operation 
(P/RMO), market price-to-operating profit (P/OP), and market price-to-net profit (P/NP) of a matching firm. Matching firm is selected based on 
its closeness with the IPO in terms of revenue from main operation, operating profit, and net profit. T-test p-value corresponds to the t-test for 
mean equal to 1. Wilcoxon p-value corresponds to the Wilcoxon signed rank test for median equal to 1.  
            
                                               Percentage  
                                         Std.    of P/V     T-test    Wilcoxon
             Mean  Median  Max    Min  Dev.   Ratios≥1    p-value    p-value  
P/RMO  1.33 1.11 16.85 0.27 1.28 0.57 0.0001  0.0001 
P/OP  1.06 0.95 10.17 0.13 0.78 0.45 0.2559  0.5378 













The Long-run Performance of Chinese A-share IPOs 
This table presents the long-run performance of Chinese A-share IPOs after listing. We 
assume there are 20 trading days in one month. Ret is the monthly return of IPOs; 
Mktret is the monthly return of A-share stock market; Matret is the monthly return of 
matching firm; Cumret is the cumulative return of IPO; Mkt Adjret is the market 
adjusted cumulative return of IPO; Mat Adjret is the matching firm adjusted 
cumulative return of IPO. * and ** represent the significance level at 10% and 5%, 
respectively.  
 
Months Ret Mktret Matret Cumret Mkt Adjret Mat Adjret
1 -1.899  -0.241 1.582* -1.899 -1.658  -3.482** 
2 -1.768**  -0.882* -1.622** -3.883** -2.812**  -3.818** 
3 0.549  -1.181** -0.796 -3.251* -0.982  -2.270 
4 0.913  -0.208 0.216 -2.907 0.037  -1.764 
5 1.614*  -0.352 -0.127 -1.925 1.811  -0.390 
6 3.211**  1.001* 1.702** 1.378 4.394**  1.058 
7 2.934**  1.760** 2.347** 3.997* 5.507**  1.256 
8 0.193  0.543 0.909 3.659 4.734**  0.471 
9 3.488**  2.404** 3.247** 7.079** 5.970**  0.658 
10 2.343**  1.707** 1.274* 9.492** 7.017**  1.637 
11 2.766**  1.050** 3.371** 12.851** 9.578**  1.463 
12 3.486**  1.925** 4.157** 15.486** 10.728**  0.493 
13 0.920  0.090 0.982 15.541** 11.286**  0.024 
14 1.871**  0.140 1.110 16.782** 12.559**  0.627 
15 1.549*  0.693 1.720* 18.454** 13.581**  0.061 
16 0.777  1.162** 1.447* 18.970** 12.835**  -0.449 
17 1.874**  1.341** 1.427* 21.169** 13.833**  0.150 
18 1.632**  0.603 1.289* 22.744** 14.767**  0.889 
19 0.741  -0.453 -0.328 24.053** 16.489**  3.042 
20 3.171**  1.383** 1.516* 28.626** 19.404**  5.638 
21 2.851**  2.408** 2.839** 32.315** 20.551**  5.933 
22 1.230  1.495** 2.314** 32.662** 19.267**  3.883 
23 0.891  1.300** 2.679** 33.181** 18.497**  1.545 
24 5.582**  5.565** 6.051** 40.417** 20.395**  0.193 
25 4.466**  4.223** 5.615** 45.600** 21.758**  -3.156 
26 4.559**  4.301** 4.914** 52.720** 24.755**  -0.904 
27 2.869**  2.968** 4.141** 55.187** 24.166**  -4.706 
28 0.777  1.303** 3.223** 53.783** 21.715**  -9.838 
29 1.859**  1.998** 3.093** 56.152** 21.647**  -12.165 
30 1.731**  0.406 1.700** 58.406** 23.081**  -14.171 
31 1.608**  0.525 0.689** 61.398** 25.278**  -12.479 
32 3.292**  2.587** 2.799** 67.852** 28.893**  -13.362 
33 3.263**  1.758** 3.017** 72.705** 32.016**  -14.194 
34 2.740**  2.450** 3.350** 74.829** 31.833**  -17.007* 
35 2.124**  1.646** 3.246** 76.968** 32.285**  -22.842** 







CARs for IPO Portfolios Based on P/V Ratios on the Listing Day 
This table reports the mean unadjusted and adjusted cumulative buy-and-hold abnormal returns (CARs) for IPO portfolios on the listing day of 
IPO. IPOs are allotted into three portfolios based on P/V ratios that are computed using the P/NP price multiple. Results for 12, 24, and 36 
months CARs are reported. The numbers in parentheses for differences in mean are p-values corresponding to the t-test which is used to test the 














No. of    Median 
Issues   P/V Ratio
     Mean Unadjusted CAR  
          of IPO (%)           
  12-       24-        36- 
 month     month     month 
    Mean CAR with respect  
     to Matching Firm (%)       
  12-       24-        36- 
 month     month     month 
    Mean CAR with respect  
       to the market (%)         
  12-       24-        36- 
 month     month     month 
Low P/V 77       0.74    19.13     43.50      84.49  7.99      18.74       -2.66  14.80      26.00     34.54 
Medium P/V 76       1.12  12.14     37.02      81.59  -1.84     -12.45      -39.34   6.82      14.46     34.17 
High P/V  77       1.50  15.14     40.69      63.76  -4.70      -5.87      -34.67  10.51      20.64     20.36 
     
Low P/V – High P/V    3.99      2.81      20.73 
(0.2957)   (0.4113)   (0.1094) 
 12.69     24.62       32.01   
(0.0789)   (0.0479)    (0.1024) 
  4.29       5.36     14.18 
(0.2578)    (0.3145)   (0.1939)  
     






Summary Statistics for A-share IPOs in China, 1997-2001 
This table presents the summary statistics for A-share IPO under-pricing and other variables. IR is the market-adjusted initial return. LAG is the 
number of days between offering and listing of IPO. SUB is subscription rate. RTN is the percent of shares retained by the state and legal entities. 
RMO is the revenue from main operation (in millions of RMB) in the year prior to offering. PE is the price-to-earnings ratio in the prospectus. 
PVRMOO, PVOPO, and PVNPO are price-to-value ratios based on P/RMO, P/OP, and P/NP multiples, respectively. 
 
 
  IR (%) LAG SUB RTN (%) RMO PE PVRMOO PVOPO PVNPO PVRMOL PVOPL PVNPL 
Mean 145.05 21.98 199.09 63.47 629.30 14.70 0.59 0.43 0.48 1.44 0.99 1.13 1997 Median 127.89 20.00 91.42 64.97 242.80 15.00 0.49 0.42 0.46 1.17 0.91 1.06 
Mean 124.27 52.52 261.35 67.23 835.44 14.38 0.55 0.47 0.62 1.15 1.12 1.30 1998 Median 112.30 41.00 238.84 69.64 349.74 14.30 0.49 0.46 0.54 1.08 0.97 1.15 
Mean 108.86 61.51 235.35 65.21 767.30 16.96 0.62 0.62 0.67 1.19 1.19 1.24 1999 Median 88.81 55.00 235.02 66.67 385.70 17.00 0.54 0.54 0.67 1.05 1.00 1.20 
Mean 154.58 32.98 406.08 64.46 595.57 31.96 0.56 0.59 0.57 1.37 1.40 1.36 2000 Median 142.61 21.00 359.03 64.53 311.77 31.00 0.49 0.46 0.54 1.15 1.10 1.20 
Mean 144.17 29.15 434.26 64.40 874.28 33.84 0.59 0.65 0.71 1.33 1.49 1.66 2001 Median 136.17 25.00 327.96 65.50 372.18 33.15 0.50 0.45 0.53 1.15 1.08 1.27 







Factors Related to IPO Under-pricing 
This table reports the regression models for the initial returns of IPOs in China from 1997-2001. LAG is the number of days between offering 
and listing of IPO. SUB is subscription rate. RTN is the percent of shares retained by the state and legal entities. RMO is the revenue from main 
operation (in millions of RMB) in the year prior to offering. TECH is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the IPO is a technology firm. EXCH 
is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the IPO is listed on the SZSE. PE is the price-to-earnings ratio in the prospectus. PELMT is a dummy 
variable that is equal to 1 if the CSRC imposes regulation of offering price when the IPO is offered. PVRMOO, PVOPO, and PVNPO (PVRMOL, 
PVOPL, and PVNPL) are relative values for issuers (for investors) based on P/RMO, P/OP, and P/NP multiples, respectively. 
 
                                                                                                                     
                  (1)          (2)           (3)          (4)             (5)          (6)            (7)          (8) 
              Coefficient    t-statistics     Coefficient    t-statistics      Coefficient    t-statistics      Coefficient    t-statistics 
Constant   139.568   5.81     200.501     6.35     192.219    9.40     183.025   13.18 
LAG      0.196   1.79       0.237     2.17       0.235    3.29       0.241    3.47 
SUB      0.014   2.20       0.011     1.79      -0.001   -0.15 
RTN     -0.067  -0.18      -0.057    -0.16      -0.143   -0.61 
RMO     -0.022  -6.72          -0.023    -6.99      -0.007   -3.02      -0.007   -3.27 
TECH     41.001   4.16      43.832     4.42      21.105    3.29      20.870    3.28 
EXCH      0.530   0.07       5.415     0.74       2.172    0.46 
PE               -1.474    -2.50      -0.999   -2.59      -0.994   -2.59 
PELMT             -48.279    -3.59     -28.009   -3.22     -27.295   -3.20 
PVRMOO                   -99.652   -7.28     -99.651   -7.30 
PVOPO                    -24.240   -2.08     -24.224   -2.08 
PVNPO                   -149.736   -9.28    -149.530   -9.29 
PVRMOL                    38.478    8.01      38.536    8.05 
PVOPL                     10.760    2.52      10.621    2.50 
PVNPL                     62.803    9.45      62.848    9.48 
 
R2       0.144          0.166          0.662          0.661               
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Table 13 
Impacts of Government Regulation of Offering Price 
This Table reports the regression results of some variables on PELMT. PELMT is a 
dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the CSRC imposes regulation of offering price 
when the IPO is offered. IR is the market-adjusted initial return. PE is the 
price-to-earnings ratio in the prospectus. SUB is subscription rate. PVRMOO, PVOPO, 
and PVNPO are price-to-value ratios at offering based on P/RMO, P/OP, and P/NP 
multiples, respectively. PVRMOL, PVOPL, and PVNPL are price-to-value ratios at 
listing based on P/RMO, P/OP, and P/NP multiples, respectively. 
 
                                                                      
Dependent            Constant                   PELMT        
Variable      Coefficient    t-statistics    Coefficient     t-statistics     R2   
IR      152.756    24.19    -22.439     -2.90  0.016 
PE       34.313    76.97    -18.890    -34.61  0.697 
SUB     402.292     9.46   -159.061     -3.06  0.018 
PVRMOO      0.569    19.60      0.018      0.51  0.000 
PVOPO       0.614    20.27     -0.118     -3.17  0.019 
PVNPO       0.619    22.11     -0.052     -1.53  0.004 
PVRMOL      1.347    16.76     -0.042     -0.43  0.000 
PVOPL       1.476    18.26     -0.400     -4.05  0.030 
PVNPL       1.493    22.44     -0.288     -3.54  0.023    
 
